dsh-supreme
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- Sep 6, 2026
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- Sep 9, 2026
Introduction
🛡️ DSH SUPREME
The governance layer for DeepSeek Harness
Seven policy plugins · one bundle install · zero upstream patches · every claim executable
"ECC gives your harness breadth. Supreme gives it a conscience."
Install · dsh plugin --profile <your-profile> add github:stadeummwt/dsh-supreme
Quick install · Why Supreme · The seven plugins · Proof wall · v1.3 features · v1.2 features · Docs
🤔 Why Supreme
DSH's plugin ecosystem (3,421 catalog entries reviewed, 2026-09) is rich in single-domain tools — a router here, a memory store there, a verifier somewhere else. Each solves one slice of governance and asks you to trust its output.
Supreme is the opposite design. It is a full governance stack — cost policy, observability, routing, verification, memory policy, workflow limits, security audit — that treats proof as a product feature: every claim in this README maps to a command you can run, and every hard rule (deny paths, cost gates, secret scrubbing) is deterministic code, not model judgment.
| The usual DSH plugin | DSH Supreme |
|---|---|
| Solves one domain | Seven governance domains, one install |
| "Trust the output" | Verdict gates — COMPLETE only when every check passes |
| Config verified by vibes | Config-key hygiene scan against real zod schemas (silent-strip trap closed) |
| Markdown evidence | Published JSON Schemas + append-only JSONL evidence stores |
| Touches core or monkey-patches | Zero upstream patches — pinned upstream, worktree clean, verified every run |
| Security as a README paragraph | Six-surface security audit (prompts · hooks · MCP · permissions · secrets · agent files) in CI |
| No ML dependency | Also no ML — deterministic counting, globs and comparisons only. Speed is a feature: router decision ≈ 0.02–0.03 ms / 1k iterations |
The core rule of this repo: bukti sebenar > klaim — real evidence over claims. If a statement here can't be re-run by you, it's marked as a claim, not a fact.
⚡ 60-second install
The repository is a dsh bundle — no build
step needed (dist/ is committed):
dsh plugin --profile <your-profile> add github:stadeummwt/dsh-supreme
That mounts all seven plugins with safe production defaults:
PAID / TRIAL routes → DENIED (hard rule, LAB-only override)
UNKNOWN cost class → DENIED
commands / network → OFF by default
router candidates → you add yours in your own patch layer (last write wins)
Pick a composition in one more line if you don't need all seven:
| Fragment | Active plugins | Use it for |
|---|---|---|
core | policy | governance floor on any profile |
standard | policy · observability · memory · verifier | daily-driver |
supreme | all seven | full stack |
lab | all seven + LAB overrides | experiments only — never production |
dsh --profile <your-profile> \
--patch "$DSH_HOME/profiles/<your-profile>/node_modules/dsh-supreme/config/compositions/standard.patch.yml"
🧩 The seven governance plugins
Exactly seven. The scope is frozen (AGENTS.md) — no scope creep without a proven blocker.
| # | Plugin | Service | What it enforces |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | supreme-policy | supremePolicy | Cost-class / risk / delegation admission. UNKNOWN cost ⇒ DENY. Paid & trial overrides are LAB-only. Unicode-taint + encoding-blob detection & denial. CoT presence gate with visibility profiles + risk gating. Deny-circumvention (deny_retry) guard. Capability-class gate. |
| 2 | supreme-observability | supremeObservability | Append-only JSONL metadata log over official DSH event seams. Allowlisted fields, secret-sentinel scrub, fail-open. |
| 3 | supreme-benchmark | supremeBenchmark | Reproducible task/run/score JSONL evidence; per-model aggregation that feeds the router; commitHash + irVersion provenance binding; evidenceBacked anti-sandbagging flag. |
| 4 | supreme-router | supremeRouter | Deterministic selection: 8 hard gates → weighted scoring → RM0-first cost-class rule → unscoredEvidenceWeight anti-sandbagging downweight → optional verifier-failure-driven effort pacing. Carries CapabilitySignal labels onto decisions. |
| 5 | supreme-verifier | supremeVerifier | Deterministic validator registry (exact-text · regex · JSON · file · command). Evidence > model self-confidence. |
| 6 | supreme-memory-policy | supremeMemoryPolicy | Memory selection policy: confidence floor, injection cap, relevance ranking, bounded append-only note ledger (credential-bearing notes rejected at admission). |
| 7 | supreme-workflow-policy | supremeWorkflowPolicy | When/how ctx.subagents / ctx.workflowEngine may run: limits, degradation ladder, glob path scoping (blocked beats allowed), verifier-gated close for HIGH-risk tasks, A2A contact graph + overreach audit. |
Four support plugins (supreme-minimal-probe, supreme-boot-probe,
supreme-gate-driver, supreme-fake-llm) exist only as test fixtures for
the suite — they never ship in the bundle.
🏁 Proof wall — every verdict runnable
Don't trust this README. Run these:
| Command | Verdict marker | What it proves |
|---|---|---|
bun run suite | COMPLETE | 101/101 Level-A checks + 5/5 real-loader boots + v1.2/v1.3/v1.3.1 audit gates |
bun run v131:verify | V131_COST_FIX_VERIFIED · V131_VERIFIER_FIX_VERIFIED · V131_MEMORY_FIX_VERIFIED · V131_A2A_FIX_VERIFIED · V131_EVIDENCE_BINDING_VERIFIED · V131_OUTCOME_ROUTING_VERIFIED · V131_FAILURE_INJECTION_VERIFIED | Review-hardening end-to-end: cost pre-dispatch deny, symlink-proof roots, JSON-schema strictness, memory isolation, A2A registry, evidence staleness, outcome routing, failure injection (465 probes — see docs/REVIEW-FIXES-v1.3.1.md) |
bun run v13:verify | V13_POLICY_E2E_COMPLETE · V13_WORKFLOW_E2E_COMPLETE · V13_ROUTING_E2E_COMPLETE | All 7 v1.3 ASTRA features end-to-end: real engines + real pinned-cordis adapters (85 + 82 + 17 probes) |
bun run bundle:verify | BUNDLE_E2E_COMPLETE | Real dsh plugin add → reconciler → boot → 13 services → user-patch override wins → clean dispose |
bun run composition:verify | COMPOSITIONS_E2E_COMPLETE | All 4 fragments: service presence and absence, relative dataDir write-through |
bun run v12:verify | V12_E2E_COMPLETE | Every v1.2 config key arrives at its service + functional probes (taint deny, effort escalation/recover, path scope, close gate, ledger) |
bun run v3:verify | V3_CONFIG_REVIEW_EVIDENCE | The silent-strip trap, live: a wrong config loses 5/6 keys → corrected config enforces 6/6 |
Level A unit checks 101/101 PASS (policy 17 · observability 7 · benchmark 11 · router 23
verifier 11 · memory 13 · workflow 19)
v1.3.1 review probes 465/465 (cost 37 · verifier 43 · memory 88 · a2a 63 ·
evidence 82 · outcome-routing 80 · failure-injection 72)
v1.3 E2E probes 184/184 (policy 85 · workflow 82 · routing 17 — real engines,
real pinned-cordis adapters, no upstream build needed)
Real-loader boots 5/5 PASS (supreme-minimal, core, standard, supreme, lab)
boot times supreme-minimal ~51–60 ms · core/standard/supreme/lab ~830–990 ms
Keyless scenario 9/9 gates PASS (real DSH session; router picks free route; PAID rejected)
Security sentinel leaks = 0 · paid automatic fallback = DISABLED
v1.2/v1.3 audit gates config-key hygiene PASS · pinned-ref scan PASS ·
six-surface audit PASS (incl. the pinned `workflow/agent-start` seam) ·
schema contract PASS (3 schemas)
Upstream integrity commit unchanged · worktree clean · patches = 0
Performance router ≈ 0.02–0.04 ms / 1k · observability serialize ≈ 0.001–0.007 ms / 1k
VERDICT COMPLETE
Honesty rule: the real-loader path (real/boot.mjs) is the only
real-integration evidence. The Level-A harness under src/harness/cordis-mini
is a lifecycle fixture — it is never cited as DSH proof.
🔐 Security guarantees
| Guarantee | Mechanism | Proof |
|---|---|---|
| Secrets never leak through observability | Secret-sentinel scrub on allowlisted fields, fail-open write path | suite: sentinelLeaks = 0 every run |
| Tainted tool arguments can't dispatch | Unicode class scan (zero-width / bidi / BOM / tag) + taintPolicy: DENY via upstream tools/pre-execute | V12_E2E_COMPLETE functional probe |
| Denying a command actually stops it | Deny-circumvention guard: same-shape retry of a denied call refused (deny_retry) — signature carries names/types, never values | V13_POLICY_E2E_COMPLETE probes |
| Hidden payloads can't ride in tool args | Encoding-blob scan (≥256-char base64/hex runs), class names + lengths only | V13_POLICY_E2E_COMPLETE probes |
| Self-declared capability labels can't buy permission | capabilityClassGate ENFORCE/AUDIT; LAB allowlist is floor-bound; labeling only RESTRICTS | V13_POLICY_E2E_COMPLETE probes |
| Inter-agent channels stay on the declared graph | allowedContacts directed edges; out-of-graph audited (a2a_contact), DENY blocks pre-fact | V13_WORKFLOW_E2E_COMPLETE probes |
| Delegations can't quietly exceed their task | Overreach audit: risk ceiling + approval gate + path scope, value-free | V13_WORKFLOW_E2E_COMPLETE probes |
| Benchmark scores can't sandbag the router | evidenceBacked flag (verifier-PASS rule) + fixed unscoredEvidenceWeight downweight | V13_ROUTING_E2E_COMPLETE probes |
| Values never echoed in audit events | Taint/contact/overreach events carry class names, ids and levels only | code + suite checks |
| Paid models never fire by accident | UNKNOWN cost ⇒ DENY; allowPaid refused outside LAB; no automatic fallback | keyless scenario gate 9/9 |
| Destructive delegation is scoped | blockedPaths > allowedPaths glob enforcement; DENY_ALL secret policy | suite checks 15 (workflow) |
| HIGH-risk work can't skip verification | requireVerifierPassOnClose evidence gate | V12_E2E_COMPLETE probe |
| Supply chain stays pinned | External refs scanned; upstream commit + irVersion bound into run records | pinned-ref scan PASS |
| Your own audit, offline | Six-surface audit: prompts · hooks · MCP · permissions · secrets · agent files | suite check PASS |
🛡️ v1.3.1 review-hardening
Response to an external v1.3.0 review: 5 findings reproduced → fixed → proven
(each with a failing test on the original code), plus outcome-based routing,
evidence-bound verification, fast path/recovery, and a failure-injection
harness. Full per-issue evidence — reproduction commands, root causes, before/
after outputs, remaining limits, and rollback steps (bash + PowerShell) — lives
in docs/REVIEW-FIXES-v1.3.1.md.
| # | Severity | Finding (v1.3.0) | Fix (v1.3.1) |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | P1 | Paid/unknown-model LLM requests dispatched with no cost check | Pre-dispatch deny at agent/request + llm/stream backstop; zero adapter calls on deny; UNKNOWN denied in production RM0; LAB exception contract kept |
| B | P1 | Symlink inside allowedRoots escaped the file-hash verifier | Native realpath validation of roots AND targets before any read; traversal/sibling-prefix/missing-file rejected; race reduced (not race-proof — documented) |
| C | P1 | latestSelection shared across sessions/tasks (memory contamination) | Selections bound to (session, task); unknown identity → empty; bounded LRU + cleanup on end/cancel/dispose |
| D | P2 | copy_file {target: b.txt} misclassified as agent-to-agent contact | Trusted comms-tool registry gates recipient extraction; post-fact emit stays detect-only |
| E | P2 | JSON Schema additionalProperties:false silently ignored (false PASS) | Deterministic validator: unsupported keywords → ERROR/UNAVAILABLE, never silent downgrade |
Run it: bun run v131:verify (7 markers, 465 probes) — then read the doc before trusting this table.
🧬 v1.3 ASTRA-hardening features
Seven deterministic hardening features from the ASTRA-1 backlog
(research/gpt6-astra-2026-09.md §7).
No ML, no new deps — every feature is engine-checked in the keyless suite and
proven end-to-end by bun run v13:verify (real engines + real pinned-cordis
adapters). The shared label contract CapabilitySignal { capabilityClass?, cotVisibility? } is exported by supreme-policy and
carried (never enforced) by the router.
supreme-policy — four features
| Config key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
cotVisibilityProfiles | {} | routeId → expected CoT visibility. A route declared none never denies on cot_missing — ENFORCE downgrades to audit-only (empty-CoT models can't be coerced into producing a trace). Resolution: explicit signal > profile > verbose. |
riskGatedCoT | false | ENFORCE applies only to HIGH-risk tools (deterministic command/network/write name classifier); non-HIGH tools keep AUDIT. |
denyCircumventionGuard | true | A same-shape retry of an already-denied call is refused with reason code deny_retry. The signature encodes argument NAMES + TYPES only — values can never enter it. First calls unaffected; resetDenyCircumvention(sessionId) is the escape hatch. |
enableEncodingScan | false | Audit/deny ≥256-char base64/hex runs in tool arguments (encoding_blob; argument NAME + run LENGTH only). Extends the v1.2 taint surface: same event, same taintPolicy. |
capabilityClassGate | 'OFF' | Gate requests carrying capabilityClass: AUDIT records, ENFORCE denies unsanctioned classes. Unlabeled requests always pass untouched. |
sanctionedCapabilityClasses / labCapabilityClassAllowlist | [] / [] | Sanction lists; the LAB allowlist is additive and binds ONLY on the LAB floor. No implicit ROUTINE exemption — a self-declared label can only RESTRICT, never grant. |
supreme-workflow-policy — two features
| Config key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
agentContactPolicy / allowedContacts | 'LOG_ONLY' / [] | A2A contact graph: directed { from, to } edges of agent ids/roles (empty = inert). Out-of-graph spawn/message contacts are audited as a2a_contact; under 'DENY' the pre-fact tools/pre-execute waterfall refuses with a2a_contact_denied. Emit-mode seams are DETECT-only. |
maxRiskLevel / approvalRequiredFor | 'HIGH' / [] | Overreach audit: delegations above the risk ceiling, listed task classes without an approval flag, or paths outside the v1.2 scope are audited as overreach_suspected (labels, levels, flags, config globs — never content). |
supreme-router + supreme-benchmark — anti-sandbagging
| Config key | Plugin | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
requireEvidenceForScores | benchmark | false | Score claims without verifier-PASS evidence are flagged evidenceBacked: false on the score + run (flag only — scores never rewritten; re-evaluated when verification lands late). |
unscoredEvidenceWeight | router | 1 | FIXED multiplicative downweight for unevidenced benchmark claims (e.g. 0.5 halves such scores); ids + factors recorded on the decision + unscored_evidence events (ids only). 1 = off, back-compat. |
| — | router | — | Carries capabilityClass / cotVisibility labels from candidates onto the selected RouteDecision (carrier, not enforcer). |
Composition fragments (v1.3 posture)
| Fragment | v1.3 keys |
|---|---|
core | denyCircumventionGuard: true pinned (the one default-ON); everything else inherits OFF defaults |
standard | enableEncodingScan: true + capabilityClassGate: AUDIT — audit-only, cannot block |
supreme | same audit-only policy posture + requireEvidenceForScores: true + workflow keys pinned at behavior-preserving defaults |
lab | enforcing demo: capabilityClassGate: ENFORCE + labCapabilityClassAllowlist, cotVisibilityProfiles + riskGatedCoT, declared contact graph + maxRiskLevel: MEDIUM, unscoredEvidenceWeight: 0.5 |
🧬 v1.2 governance features
Deterministic. No ML. No new runtime deps. Every feature binds to a real
pinned upstream seam and ships with engine checks + boot-level proof
(bun run v12:verify).
supreme-policy — unicode taint denial + CoT presence gate
Upstream freezes tool arguments after logging (wrappers may change only
exec.signal), so the enforceable host-side posture is detect → audit →
deny through the official tools/pre-execute seam ({ kind: 'deny', reason } — upstream materializes the error result; Supreme never fabricates
tool output):
| Config key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
enableUnicodeSanitization | true | scan tool arguments for zero-width / bidi-isolate / bidi-override / tag codepoints (U+200B–200F, U+2060–206F, U+202A–202E, U+FEFF, U+E0000–E007F) |
logTaintAttempts | true | record taint_detected events — class names only, values are NEVER echoed |
taintPolicy | LOG_ONLY | DENY refuses the call before dispatch |
reasoningTracePolicy | OFF | AUDIT records cot_missing when an assistant message carried no reasoning trace; ENFORCE additionally denies that session's tool calls (ENFORCE refused on the CORE floor) |
supreme-router — RM0-first + effort pacing
| Config key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
costFirst | true | score only the cheapest eligible cost class — FREE_CONFIRMED beats a rate-limited peer with better history; hard-gate evidence for ALL candidates preserved |
effortPacing.enabled | false | deterministic costClass → reasoningEffort mapping over the pinned agent/request seam (pinned DeepSeek levels: off / low / high / max) |
effortPacing.escalateOnVerifierFail | true | one-step escalation (low → high) driven only by verifier FAIL evidence via reportVerifierOutcome() — never model self-confidence; PASS recovers |
supreme-workflow-policy — surgical path scope + verifier-gated close
| Config key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
allowedPaths / blockedPaths | [] / [] | zero-dependency glob scope for delegations (** crosses segments, */? stay in-segment); blocked always wins; empty allowlist = unrestricted |
requireVerifierPassOnClose | false | HIGH-risk tasks may only close with recorded verifier PASS evidence |
supreme-memory-policy — bounded ledger + instinct-style gates
| Config key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
ledgerEnabled | false | opt-in bounded, append-only JSONL note ledger (ledgerDir, ledgerFileName, ledgerMaxEntries) — credential-bearing notes rejected at admission |
minConfidence | 0.7 | notes below this confidence never inject (ECC instincts analogue — recorded evidence quality, not self-assessment) |
maxInjected | 6 | hard cap per selection |
relevanceRanking | true | deterministic task-token-overlap ranking before priority (counting, not ANN) |
supreme-benchmark — provenance binding
Run records accept commitHash (40-hex sha or UNAVAILABLE) and irVersion
— malformed values are rejected by validation, so routing evidence stays bound
to the code that produced it.
Published schemas + audit suite
schemas/suite-report.schema.json·benchmark-record.schema.json·ledger-note.schema.json— third parties can validate reports/records; a suite check keeps schemas and code from drifting.- Suite also runs config-key hygiene (every shipped YAML row validated against the plugin's real zod schema — the silent-strip trap stays closed), pinned-ref scan, and the six-surface security audit.
📦 Install as a dsh bundle
The repository IS the bundle: package.json declares dsh.bundle.patch →
cordis.patch.yml, which inserts the seven frozen
plugins as profile rows. Any profile can adopt Supreme through the official
plugin flow:
# from a local checkout…
dsh plugin --profile <your-profile> add /path/to/dsh-supreme
# …or straight from GitHub
dsh plugin --profile <your-profile> add github:stadeummwt/dsh-supreme
# prove an install end-to-end (real CLI install + boot + layering checks)
bun run bundle:verify
# prove the v1.2 config surface end-to-end
bun run v12:verify
# prove the v1.3 ASTRA-hardening features end-to-end (all three verifiers)
bun run v13:verify
The bundle mounts the seven plugins with safe production defaults (PAID /
TRIAL denied, commands/network off, zero router candidates). Extend
candidates, project knowledge, and workflow limits from YOUR profile patch
layer — the composer applies last write wins per row id, so user config
always beats bundle defaults. The four support/fixture plugins are NOT part of
the bundle: they never ship into user profiles.
Composition fragments ship under
config/compositions/ — the bundle-world analogue
of manifest-driven install profiles. Each fragment UPDATE-patches the bundle
rows by id (whole-config replacement, disabled: true for rows outside the
composition) and carries no name restatement, so it stays
install-location-independent. Prove all four end-to-end:
bun run composition:verify → COMPOSITIONS_E2E_COMPLETE.
Notes: dsh plugin add requires pnpm on PATH; installing from GitHub works
without a prepare build because dist/ is committed. Fragment paths are
relative to the dsh process working directory — override any row from your
own patch layer.
🏗️ Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Next.js dashboard (project app) — PROJECTION only, owns no state │
│ GET/POST /api/supreme/* (dev/LAB only) │
└──────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│ reads suite reports / triggers runs
┌──────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SUPREME PLUGIN LAYER (dsh-supreme/dist/plugins, project-owned) │
│ policy · observability · benchmark · router · verifier · │
│ memory-policy · workflow-policy (+ 4 support/fixture plugins) │
│ Cordis conventions: name/inject/Config(Standard Schema)/apply │
└──────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│ inject: official DSH service names
┌──────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ DSH CORE (pinned upstream — never modified) │
│ ctx.llm · ctx.sessions · ctx.systemPrompt · ctx.tokenMeter · │
│ ctx.credentials · ctx.subagents · ctx.workflowEngine │
│ Events: session/* · agent/request* · tools/execute · │
│ subagent/* · workflow/* │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Dependency direction (acyclic, enforced):
DSH core services → Supreme plugins (injected seams)
supremePolicy → verifier, router, workflow-policy
supremeObservability → router, verifier (optional), workflow-policy
supremeBenchmark → router (router reads history; benchmark NEVER depends on router)
supremeVerifier → workflow-policy (verification evidence consulted)
Pinned upstream
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness |
| Pinned commit | d347e703908d0406b7a7ef80e3a0e594d86b2215 (master, tag dsh-v0.1.3-alpha.1) |
| DSH version | 0.1.3-alpha.1 |
| Vendored Cordis | 4.0.2 (vendor/cordis) |
| Upstream worktree | kept pristine — UPSTREAM_CORE_MODIFIED = NO, patch count 0 |
| Toolchain | Node v24 (v24.19.0), pnpm 11.7.0, Bun 1.3.14 (bundler) |
The pinned upstream checkout is read-only for this project. It is resolved
at runtime: DSH_UPSTREAM_ROOT env override → sibling ../deepseek-harness →
in-project node_modules/.upstream/deepseek-harness. Prefer the sibling
location: some upstream builds (pnpm + declaration emit) reject checkouts
nested under a node_modules directory. All Supreme code lives in
project-owned paths.
Compositions (profiles)
| Profile | Bundle | Mounted Supreme plugins |
|---|---|---|
supreme-minimal | none (bare Loader) | minimal probe only |
core | @deepseek-ai/dsh-base | minimal probe, boot probe, supreme-policy (CORE) |
standard | @deepseek-ai/dsh-base | + observability, memory-policy, verifier |
supreme | @deepseek-ai/dsh-base | all 7 + fake-llm + gate-driver (SUPREME policy) |
lab | @deepseek-ai/dsh-base | all 7 + fake-llm + gate-driver, LAB-only overrides (allowPaid: true, allowCommands: true, maxConcurrentAgents: 4) |
Full layer map + verified real-API evidence table:
docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md.
🚀 Build & verify from source
Prerequisites: Node ≥ 24, pnpm 11.7.0 (upstream build), Bun ≥ 1.3. Commands
assume the repo root (dsh-supreme/ as published; inside the companion
Next.js workspace the suite auto-detects both layouts).
# 1. Install dependencies
bun install
# 2. Clone the pinned DSH upstream (default lookup: sibling ../deepseek-harness;
# any location works via DSH_UPSTREAM_ROOT — avoid nesting it under node_modules)
git clone https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness.git ../deepseek-harness
git -C ../deepseek-harness checkout d347e703908d0406b7a7ef80e3a0e594d86b2215
# 3. Build the pinned upstream libraries — official tsconfig graph, memory-batched
# (one tsc -b over the 217-ref host graph needs ~4 GB headroom; the batched
# runner keeps each invocation under 2 GB)
npm run build:upstream
# 4. Bundle every Supreme plugin to dist/ (one ESM file per plugin; zod external)
PLUGINS="supreme-policy supreme-observability supreme-benchmark supreme-router \
supreme-verifier supreme-memory-policy supreme-workflow-policy \
supreme-minimal-probe supreme-boot-probe supreme-gate-driver supreme-fake-llm"
for p in $PLUGINS; do
bun build src/plugins/$p/index.ts \
--outfile dist/plugins/$p/index.mjs \
--format esm --target node --external zod
done
Each dist bundle externalizes only zod and Node builtins; @deepseek-ai/cordis
appears solely as erased type imports. This exact command was verified to
reproduce the committed dist/plugins/supreme-policy/index.mjs byte-for-byte.
Real boot (the only real-integration evidence)
# Boot any composition through the REAL pinned DSH Loader and dispose cleanly.
# --setup installs the profile under $DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>/ from config/.
node real/boot.mjs --profile supreme-minimal --setup
node real/boot.mjs --profile core --setup
node real/boot.mjs --profile standard --setup
node real/boot.mjs --profile supreme --setup
node real/boot.mjs --profile lab --setup
Each run prints one JSON result (bootMs, disposeMs, services presence
map, gate results) and exits non-zero on any failure. Gate markers are
appended under data/real/ — see the runbooks for
expected markers per profile.
Suite execution
bun run suite # full suite incl. 5 real boots (needs the built upstream)
bun run suite:json # machine-readable SuiteReport
bun run suite:keyless # Level A only — runs without the upstream; verdict stays
# PARTIAL (REAL_BOOT_SKIPPED, UPSTREAM_CHECKOUT_UNAVAILABLE)
bun run suite:keyless:ci # keyless with CI-friendly exit code: 0 iff verdict is PARTIAL
# with only the documented keyless blockers — any real
# failure (UNIT/leaks/hygiene/audit/schema) still fails
The suite exits 0 only when every mandatory gate passes (verdict: COMPLETE). Any failure prints the exact blocking gates.
HTTP API (dashboard projection — dev/LAB only)
The Next.js app exposes a thin, read-mostly projection over the suite. It owns
no runtime state; runs live in an in-memory store (latest 20 runs) and
suite execution is disabled in production (NODE_ENV=production returns 403
unless SUPREME_ENABLE_SUITE=1).
| Endpoint | Method | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
/api/supreme/status | GET | Suite scope (frozen 7 plugins, compositions), upstream commit/cleanliness, DSH/cordis versions, runtime info. Always safe. |
/api/supreme/report | GET | Last SuiteReport from memory; 404 if no run yet (POST /api/supreme/suite/run first). |
/api/supreme/suite/run | POST | Executes the full suite (including 5 real boots). dev/LAB only — 403 in production without SUPREME_ENABLE_SUITE=1. |
/api/supreme/suite/runs/:id | GET | One run record (runId, startedAt, durationMs, full report); 404 for unknown ids. |
Implementation: src/app/api/supreme/** + src/lib/supreme-suite.ts
(project app, outside dsh-supreme/).
📤 Distribution (manual, owner-driven)
Repo policy: no pull requests are opened on third-party repositories on the
owner's behalf. Prepared submission artifacts live in
distribution/:
awesome-dsh-entry.yml— catalog-ready entry (single file, categorysecurity, validator-conformant keys only).SUBMISSION-GUIDE.md— how listing on dsh-market actually works (it auto-feeds from the awesome-dsh-plugin catalog), the pre-flight gate checklist, the exact manual submission commands, and the npm-publish note.
The GitHub repo already carries the dsh-plugin topic and a dsh.bundle
manifest, so the only remaining step for listing is the manual one-file PR the
owner chooses to make.
📁 Directory layout
dsh-supreme/ (repo root as published)
├── README.md ← this file
├── VISION.md ← original v1 project vision (frozen architecture contract)
├── CHANGELOG.md
├── AGENTS.md ← engineering rules for future agents
├── SOURCE-OF-TRUTH.md ← upstream integrity record (historical + current)
├── LICENSE ← MIT (v1.2)
├── package.json # suite/boot/build/verify scripts (zod + yaml deps)
├── schemas/ # published JSON Schemas (suite report, benchmark, ledger)
├── .github/workflows/ci.yml # keyless + full suite on push/PR (v1.2)
├── config/
│ ├── supreme-minimal.cordis.yml # bare-Loader probe gate
│ ├── core.cordis.yml # CORE composition
│ ├── standard.cordis.yml # STANDARD composition
│ ├── supreme.cordis.yml # SUPREME composition (all 7)
│ ├── lab.cordis.yml # LAB composition (LAB-only overrides)
│ ├── examples/ # corrected config example (provenance noted)
│ └── compositions/ # 4 overlay fragments (core/standard/supreme/lab)
├── distribution/ # manual submission artifacts (no auto-PRs)
│ ├── awesome-dsh-entry.yml # catalog entry draft (one file)
│ └── SUBMISSION-GUIDE.md # owner-driven listing walkthrough
├── real/
│ ├── boot.mjs # REAL DSH boot harness (Loader + root-fiber dispose)
│ ├── bundle-verify.mjs # E2E: real CLI install + layering (BUNDLE_E2E_COMPLETE)
│ ├── composition-verify.mjs # E2E: 4 composition fragments (COMPOSITIONS_E2E_COMPLETE)
│ ├── v3-config-verify.mjs # E2E: silent-strip proof (V3_CONFIG_REVIEW_EVIDENCE)
│ ├── v12-config-verify.mjs # E2E: v1.2 config surface + probes (V12_E2E_COMPLETE)
│ ├── v13-policy-verify.mjs # E2E: v1.3 policy features, 85 probes (V13_POLICY_E2E_COMPLETE)
│ ├── v13-workflow-verify.mjs# E2E: v1.3 A2A + overreach, 82 probes (V13_WORKFLOW_E2E_COMPLETE)
│ ├── v13-routing-verify.mjs # E2E: v1.3 labels + anti-sandbagging, 17 probes (V13_ROUTING_E2E_COMPLETE)
│ └── build-batched.sh # memory-batched official upstream build
├── dist/plugins/<name>/index.mjs # bun-built ESM bundles loaded by the real Loader
├── data/
│ ├── observability/observability.jsonl # runtime metadata log
│ ├── benchmark/benchmark.jsonl # routing evidence store
│ └── real/*.markers.jsonl # boot/gate markers (verified evidence)
├── src/
│ ├── plugins/ # engine.ts (pure logic) + index.ts (Cordis adapter) per plugin
│ │ ├── supreme-policy/ supreme-observability/ supreme-benchmark/
│ │ ├── supreme-router/ supreme-verifier/ supreme-memory-policy/
│ │ ├── supreme-workflow-policy/
│ │ └── supreme-minimal-probe/ supreme-boot-probe/ supreme-gate-driver/ supreme-fake-llm/
│ ├── suite/ # runner.ts + cli.ts + engine-checks.ts + config-hygiene.ts
│ │ # + surface-audit.ts + schema-contract.ts + harness.ts
│ └── harness/cordis-mini/ # Level-A lifecycle FIXTURE only (never cited as DSH proof)
└── docs/
├── architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md
├── decisions/ADR-0000 … ADR-0007
└── runbooks/ # install, build, test, boot-*, upgrade-pinned-dsh, rollback
📖 Documentation map
| Doc | Contents |
|---|---|
AGENTS.md | Frozen scope, upstream rules, Cordis conventions, ownership table, verification requirements |
docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md | Layer map, verified real-API evidence table, event seams, composition layering |
docs/decisions/ | ADR-0000 (fixture history) + ADR-0001…0007 (one per major decision) |
docs/runbooks/ | install, build, test, boot-core/standard/supreme/lab, upgrade-pinned-dsh, rollback |
research/ | ECC dissection (253,948★) + v3 plan review — the data behind the v1.2 roadmap |
SOURCE-OF-TRUTH.md | Upstream integrity record (historical + current) |
| Per-plugin READMEs | src/plugins/<name>/README.md — purpose, config tables, contracts, security boundaries |
CHANGELOG.md | Version history with evidence markers per release |
❓ FAQ
Q: Does Supreme modify DeepSeek Harness?
No. The pinned upstream worktree stays pristine — UPSTREAM_CORE_MODIFIED = NO, patch count 0, re-verified on every suite run. Supreme is an ordinary
Cordis plugin layer that consumes official services and event seams.
Q: Is any of this AI-powered? None. Every gate is deterministic code — counting, glob matching, string comparison, zod validation. That's why the router decides in ~0.02–0.03 ms and why results are reproducible on your machine, today.
Q: Why does UNKNOWN cost deny the model?
Because an unclassified route is an unaudited spend path. supreme-policy
treats it as a hard DENY; paid/trial classes require an explicit LAB-only
override. RM0-first routing then prefers FREE_CONFIRMED candidates
deterministically.
Q: Can I use just the policy plugin?
Yes — that's the core fragment. Or
standard for the daily-driver
four. Fragments are one-line overlays on your own profile.
Q: What if my config has a typo or an unknown key?
The v1.2 suite runs a config-key hygiene scan: every shipped YAML row is
validated against the plugin's real zod schema, so the "boot passes but your
governance keys were silently stripped" trap (proven live in
V3_CONFIG_REVIEW_EVIDENCE) stays closed.
Q: Does it work offline / air-gapped? The six-surface audit, taint scanning, ledger and all suite checks are fully offline and deterministic. Real boots need the pinned upstream checked out locally — no network calls at runtime.
Q: Why isn't Supreme listed in the dsh-market yet?
Listing requires a one-file PR to the catalog, and this repo's policy is that
such PRs are made by the owner, manually (see
distribution/SUBMISSION-GUIDE.md).
Everything else is already prepared.
📜 Honest limitations
- The real-loader path via
real/boot.mjsis the only real-integration evidence; the Level-A lifecycle harness (src/harness/cordis-mini) is a fixture and is never cited as DSH proof. - Keyless suite verdict is honestly
PARTIAL(REAL_BOOT_SKIPPED) without a built pinned upstream — it does not fake completeness. - Deferred items (documented, not forgotten): HNSW-style memory indexing and Archify-style schema migration stay out of scope for the frozen seven.
- Router candidates ship empty (zero-by-default): you add models from your own patch layer. Supreme governs choices; it does not preselect providers.
Built proof-first. Bukti sebenar > klaim.
If Supreme hardened your harness, consider starring the repo — it helps other DSH users find governance tooling.